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Titlebook: Game Theory; A Multi-Leveled Appr Hans Peters Textbook 20081st edition Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008 Applications of Game Theory.N

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51#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 11:54:38 | 只看該作者
f interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory.This book presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to al
52#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 14:28:15 | 只看該作者
53#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 20:24:42 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-7529-3 12.1 presents a proof of the Minimax Theorem, and Sect. 12.2 shows how a matrix game can be solved – optimal strategies and the value of the game can be found – by solving an associated linear programming problem.
54#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 22:16:37 | 只看該作者
Reaktionsbereitschaft des Organismus,the present chapter is largely self-contained..This chapter is based mainly on [147]. In Sect. 15.1 we briefly review symmetric two-player games. Section 15.2 discusses evolutionary stable strategies and Sect. 15.3 replicator dynamics.
55#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 02:25:49 | 只看該作者
56#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 08:55:07 | 只看該作者
Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Setvalue is an attractive core selection (Sect. 18.2). Finally, we study random order values (Sect. 18.3), which fill out the Weber set, and the subset of weighted Shapley values, which still cover the core (Sect. 18.4).
57#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 11:34:07 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48202-1 basics about refinements of Nash equilibrium. Section 13.7 is on correlated equilibrium in bimatrix games, and Sect. 13.8 concludes with an axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium based on a reduced game (consistency) condition.
58#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 14:59:58 | 只看該作者
Diagnostik der Hautkrankheiten, mixed strategies. Section 14.3 is on Nash equilibrium and its main refinements, namely subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. For more about refinements and some relations with refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic form games see [138] and [102].
59#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 20:59:48 | 只看該作者
60#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 21:45:05 | 只看該作者
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