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Titlebook: Game Theory; A Multi-Leveled Appr Hans Peters Textbook 20081st edition Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008 Applications of Game Theory.N

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21#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 06:35:45 | 只看該作者
22#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 08:32:59 | 只看該作者
IntroductionThe best introduction to game theory is by way of examples. In this chapter we start with a global definition of the field in Sect. 1.1, collect some historical facts in Sect. 1.2, and present examples in Sect. 1.3. In Sect. 1.4 we briefly comment on the distinction between cooperative and noncooperative game theory.
23#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 13:39:55 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-5020-7 sum of the players’ payoffs or expected payoffs is always equal to zero. Games like the ‘Battle of the Bismarck Sea’ and ‘Matching Pennies’, discussed in Sect. 1.3.1 belong to this class..In Sect. 2.1 the basic definitions and theory are discussed. Section 2.2 shows how to solve 2 × . and . × 2 gam
24#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 17:59:21 | 只看該作者
G?sta H. Liljequist,Konrad Cehaktrast to Chap. 2 it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs is zero (or, equivalently, constant). This allows for a much larger class of games, including many games relevant for economic or other applications. Famous examples are the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ and the ‘Battle of the Sex
25#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 20:26:40 | 只看該作者
26#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 03:09:41 | 只看該作者
27#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 05:28:15 | 只看該作者
28#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 12:33:43 | 只看該作者
Die Statistik in der Vergangenheita Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even if the game is repeated a finite number of times, cf. Problem 4.8(a)–(c). As we will see in this chapter, this bad outcome can be avoided if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. This, however, is going to have a price, namely t
29#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 13:17:59 | 只看該作者
30#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 17:03:42 | 只看該作者
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