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Titlebook: Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia; Game-Playing Experim Claudia Keser Book 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992 Duopo

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 17:26:00 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia
副標(biāo)題Game-Playing Experim
編輯Claudia Keser
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/319/318822/318822.mp4
叢書名稱Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
圖書封面Titlebook: Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia; Game-Playing Experim Claudia Keser Book 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992 Duopo
描述This report portrays the results of experimental research on dynamic duopoly markets with demand inertia. Two methods of experimentation are studied: game-playing experiments where subjects interact spontaneously via computer terminals, and computer tournaments between strategies designed by subjects. The principal aim of this study is the understanding of boundedly rational decision making in the dynamic duopoly situation. 1. 1 Motivation The experiments examine a multistage duopoly game where prices in each period are the only decision variables. Sales depend on current prices and also on past sales (demand inertia). Applying the game-theoretic concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved by backward induction. The result is a uniquely determined system of decision rules. However, we can hardly expect that human beings behave according to the equilibrium strategy of this game. It is unlikely that subjects are able to compute the equilibrium. And even if a subject is able to compute it, he might not make use of this knowledge. Only if he expects the others to behave according to the equilibrium, it is optimal for him to play the equilibrium strategy. We have evidence
出版日期Book 1992
關(guān)鍵詞Duopolm?rkte; Duopoly Markets; Experimental Economics; Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; Game Theory;
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4
isbn_softcover978-3-540-56090-6
isbn_ebook978-3-642-48144-4Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
issn_series 0075-8442
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992
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沙發(fā)
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 00:06:05 | 只看該作者
0075-8442 f this knowledge. Only if he expects the others to behave according to the equilibrium, it is optimal for him to play the equilibrium strategy. We have evidence978-3-540-56090-6978-3-642-48144-4Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
板凳
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 00:32:15 | 只看該作者
Book 1992game-playing experiments where subjects interact spontaneously via computer terminals, and computer tournaments between strategies designed by subjects. The principal aim of this study is the understanding of boundedly rational decision making in the dynamic duopoly situation. 1. 1 Motivation The ex
地板
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 08:04:16 | 只看該作者
0075-8442 studied: game-playing experiments where subjects interact spontaneously via computer terminals, and computer tournaments between strategies designed by subjects. The principal aim of this study is the understanding of boundedly rational decision making in the dynamic duopoly situation. 1. 1 Motivat
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 09:36:46 | 只看該作者
978-3-540-56090-6Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 13:38:07 | 只看該作者
Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia978-3-642-48144-4Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
7#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 19:01:40 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4Duopolm?rkte; Duopoly Markets; Experimental Economics; Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; Game Theory;
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 23:24:26 | 只看該作者
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 03:34:24 | 只看該作者
Genetic Algorithms for Machine LearningIn this chapter we deal with the question to what extent the strategies also reveal the structure of subjects’ spontaneous behavior in game-playing experiments. Let us start with a rough comparison of the outcomes of the game-playing experiments and the strategy tournaments.
10#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 08:54:36 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/b101880The actual behavior of subjects is different from what is prescibed by the subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the game.
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