Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 14th International C Jie Fu,Tomas Kroupa,Yezekael Hayel Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (i

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Observable Perfect Equilibriumtermine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently on

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Does Cyber-Insurance Benefit the?Insured or?the?Attacker? – A Game of?Cyber-Insurance breaches. The rapid expansion of cyber-insurance in recent years hints the strong demand for cyber-insurance and its benefits. However, the impacts of cyber-insurance practice on cybersecurity enhancement and cyber-attackers are largely unknown. In this paper we study the optimal cybersecurity inve

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Rule Enforcing Through Orderingarge number of individuals. Common practice is to give each individual a chance to suffer a smaller . and be guaranteed to avoid the legal process with probable considerably larger punishment. However, thanks to the large number of offenders and a limited capacity of the central authority, the indiv

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Shades of?Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for?Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles an ethical to an unethical hacking role to disclose or exploit the vulnerabilities for malicious benefit. This paper focuses on the emerging topic of game-theoretical modelling of the phenomenon of grey-hat hackers. A two-player complete information bimatrix game is designed to capture the strategi

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Characterizing and?Improving the?Robustness of?Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworksrk shows the traditional predict-then-optimize (PTO) framework can be improved by training a predictive model with respect to the optimization task through a PTO paradigm called . Little is known, however, about the performance of traditional PTO and decision-focused learning when exposed to .. We p

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Quantisation Effects in?Adversarial Cyber-Physical Gamesaluate nonconvex game dynamics. Complex adversarial security games often exhibit nonconvex behaviour such as those admitted by a Kuramoto-Sakaguchi system with Lanchester dynamics. We pose this system as a two-player, zero-sum dynamic security game, where players seek to gain a decision advantage ov

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Scalable Learning of?Intrusion Response Through Recursive Decompositiond stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense strategies co-evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play toward an equilibrium. Solutions proposed in previous work prove the feasibility of this approach for small infrastructures but do not scale to realis

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Honeypot Allocation for?Cyber Deception in?Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers’ preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that g