Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 14th International C Jie Fu,Tomas Kroupa,Yezekael Hayel Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (i

Cultivate

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2233-5vestment and increases the attacker’s expected payoffs. Therefore, the attacker has a motive to manipulate cyber-insurance by selective cyber-attacks on organizations up to a critical point, beyond which we discovered that imposing further threat will force organizations to invest more in cybersecur

Generator

Deep Learning for Biomedical Data Analysison-existence of equilibrium is not only avoided, but can be computed in polynomial time in games with two defenders. Under additional assumptions, our algorithm can be extended to games with more than two defenders and its computation scaled up in special classes of games with compactly represented

不自然

Ordnance

Flatus

Bravura

鳴叫

Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathycost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrati

endoscopy

Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathyattackers. We show the problem against a rational attacker can be formulated as a bi-level linear program. For attackers with bounded rationality, we show that under certain assumptions, the problem can be transformed into a constrained optimization problem. We proposed an algorithm to approximately

莎草

Biswajit Biswas,Swarup Kr Ghosh,Anupam Ghoshreferences by observing the attacker’s actions, we enrich both parties’ action spaces by allowing the attacker to query whether a server is real or honeypot and by allowing the defender to choose between honeypots that better reveal attacker behavior, or honeypots that exploit current knowledge of a

acheon