Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 14th International C Jie Fu,Tomas Kroupa,Yezekael Hayel Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (i

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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學科排名




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學科排名




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Uday Kamath,John Liu,James Whitakerrol over multiple devices. This particular epidemic has been employed in some of the most extensive and widespread distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [.]. To take control of numerous devices, the attacker’s strategy consists of injecting malicious code from an infected device into one or m

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justify

Bumptious

Zakir Hussain,Malaya Dutta Borahaluate nonconvex game dynamics. Complex adversarial security games often exhibit nonconvex behaviour such as those admitted by a Kuramoto-Sakaguchi system with Lanchester dynamics. We pose this system as a two-player, zero-sum dynamic security game, where players seek to gain a decision advantage ov

Aromatic

Prasannavenkatesan Theerthagirid stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense strategies co-evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play toward an equilibrium. Solutions proposed in previous work prove the feasibility of this approach for small infrastructures but do not scale to realis