Titlebook: Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"; Paolo Di Lucia,Edoardo Fittipaldi Book 2021 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(

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Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisited of authoritative authors both old (e.g. Grotius) and recent (e.g. Charles Pigden). It is not, nor does it attempt to be, an erudite review of the very large literature on the topic in question. Rather, it focuses on certain fine points of the Searlean derivation, points that, while striking, have l

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Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View chapter explores an alternative grounding of normativity on “l(fā)aws of essence” (rather than on constitutive rules), a grounding that proceeds by addressing the crucial problem of how to locate essences (and thus values) in a world of facts. To that end, classical phenomenology is shown to be an onto

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How to Derive Is from Ought them into deontic and adeontic eidetic-constitutive rules, while also drawing some other key distinctions. On the basis of these distinctions, we are shown that Searle’s constitutive rules are heterogeneous and that his “X counts as Y formula” fails to capture a variety of phenomena, including prom

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Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules is that starting in the 1970s, a conversation on this topic emerged in Italian legal philosophy, reaching a depth and complexity hardly matched anywhere else in the world. This is due chiefly to the work of Gaetano Carcaterra and Amedeo G. Conte. This chapter moves that conversation forward by conn

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“Ought” Is Spoken in Many Wayske the practical sense explicit by introducing the concept of .. However, he does not distinguish between . of “ought.” This chapter therefore attempts to make up for that lack of nuance by distinguishing among three kinds of “ought”—a bouletic, an axiological, and an eidetic “ought”—and suggesting

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