Titlebook: Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents; Contributions to Soc Anita Konzelmann Ziv,Hans Bernhard Schmid Book 2014 Springer Science+Busines

neutralize

Social Objects without Intentionsl entity’s “grounds” and its “anchors.” For both, I argue that intentions, either individual or collective, are less essential than many theorists have assumed. Instead, I propose a more worldly—and less intellectualist—approach to social ontology.

編輯才信任

Acting over Time, Acting Togethercapacities for temporally extended and shared intentional agency are human capacities for planning agency. The conceptual, metaphysical, and normative resources in play in our planning agency provide a backbone of our temporally extended and shared intentional agency.

MORPH

,Introduction: Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents—Contributions to Social Ontology,ics provide insights into social structures and functions that cannot be ignored by social ontology. Similarly, social psychology, history and linguistics can teach us relevant lessons about the mechanisms of establishing and overthrowing social power.

Foolproof

The Logical Form of Totalitarianismtifies or does not. In each case, social identification operates over an individual’s social behavior as a reinforcement of the group with which he identifies, or an erosive element of the institution that he finds alien and oppressive.

一大塊

Emergence and Empathy empathy, and discuss some speculations about its mechanism. In a third and concluding section, I draw on both the preceding discussion as well as some further considerations to buttress sceptical doubts about the importance of empathy for morality.

Vulvodynia

2542-9094 states in creating social facts.Explores the core topics of.The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties o

Intercept

Patrimony

extract

Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Othersthe group to decide. The members collectively accept (recognize) status functions, goals and beliefs for the group. This paper asks whether this thesis of “forgroupness” should be re-evaluated: could the status functions, goals and beliefs be in some significant sense “for others” as well? Can the group be dependent on others’ takes?

Ceremony

How Where , Stand Constrains Where , Stand: Applying Bratman’s Account of Self-Governance to Collecttand the normative interplay between the individual and the collective. It changes the way we must see the universality of the normative force of collective intentions and it emphasises the importance of the individual’s agentive identity being entangled with the agentive identity of the collective.