Titlebook: Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents; Contributions to Soc Anita Konzelmann Ziv,Hans Bernhard Schmid Book 2014 Springer Science+Busines

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吞噬

Document Actsto the ways in which documents can be used to bring about a variety of effects in virtue of the fact that, where speech is evanescent, documents are continuant entities. This means that documents can be preserved in such a way that they can be inspected and modified at successive points in time and

詳細目錄

中國紀念碑

Social Objects without Intentions is commonly overestimated. I introduce a distinction that is implicit in much discussion of social ontology, but is often overlooked: between a social entity’s “grounds” and its “anchors.” For both, I argue that intentions, either individual or collective, are less essential than many theorists hav

不可救藥

The Logical Form of Totalitarianismere the institution in question is oppressive and not enjoyed by the collective of individuals inhabiting such an institution: How is it possible to cooperate unwillingly yet intentionally? Are such individuals complicity reinforcing the regimes that oppress them? This chapter addresses despotic reg

為寵愛

無瑕疵

人造

Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality. A Taxonomy in Social Ontology will argue . on heterotropic intentionality: (i) the heterotropism thesis identifies a great divide within the vast domain of intentional phenomena: solitary ones (which need just one individual in order to exist) .. heterotropic ones (which need at least two individuals in order to exist); (ii) th

使習慣于

Emergence and Empathylay in motivating moral behaviour. The present chapter addresses both of these questions in the light of considerations about how shared experiences emerge from emotional interactions between individuals. It comprises three parts. I begin with the more general issue of the reducibility of collective

Metastasis