Titlebook: Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems; Theory and Implicati Markus Berndt Book 2002 Deutscher Universit?ts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesba

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Patrick Bartels,Michael H. Breitners is separated in three parts. After the setup, it is first shown how the interaction of corporate governance and capital markets produces network effects that lead to a persistent coordination of corporate governance strategies between firms. In this section, the influence of law is taken as exogen

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Nicole Baumüller,Carsten Baumgarthaw enforcement, ..). The reason for this is straightforward. The easier it is for an agent to exploit the principal, the higher are the resulting agency cost. Since the outsider system relies heavily on arm’s length financing supported by the legal system it is reasonable to assume that the autonomo

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Carsten Baumgarth,Dirk-Mario Boltzades. The resulting implications for corporate governance reforms have been given in chapter 8. The analysis, so far, has focused on two sources of network effects that influence a corporate governance system. These are network effects via capital markets and network effects via regulation. This fin

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Differences in Corporate Governance Systems,stem” implies that it is made up of many components. It is inevitable to concentrate on some selected parts of an elaborate system. While this always entails the danger of missing important points, it is only by abstraction that we can learn anything at all about a complex topic like corporate gover

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Analytical Framework, of capital, as proven by Modigliani and Miller (1958). In their seminal paper, however, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the separation of ownership and control that is associated with corporate finance produces agency costs. Classical agency costs arise from asymmetric distribution of informat

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Dispersed Control - the Outsider System,e control (Hart, 1995). The logic of this is as follows. If the external environment and the particulars of a young firm that is about to go public render dispersed control the optimal governance strategy, a seller at an IPO has an incentive to choose the optimal institutional arrangements for this

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