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Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

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21#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 05:52:25 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-2-287-33478-8tegies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.
22#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 11:05:14 | 只看該作者
,Untersuchung der flüssigen Fette,al results show that the higher the efficiency of the civil monitoring effort, the efficiency of institutions and the lower the discount rate; the higher the inertia which will lead the economy to a much earlier switch to good regime with low corruption as the jump occurs early.
23#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 13:05:04 | 只看該作者
Rudolf Benedikt,Ferdinand Ulzer (Professor)ation combining game theory and other techniques. The chapter highlights the recognized challenges associated with the applicability of game theory in the cyber world. It discusses how the game-theoretic formalism can be adapted to obtain sound solutions in a reasonable time.
24#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 18:16:14 | 只看該作者
25#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 20:43:26 | 只看該作者
26#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 01:01:39 | 只看該作者
Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game,tegies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.
27#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 04:22:00 | 只看該作者
Building Efficient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game,al results show that the higher the efficiency of the civil monitoring effort, the efficiency of institutions and the lower the discount rate; the higher the inertia which will lead the economy to a much earlier switch to good regime with low corruption as the jump occurs early.
28#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 10:14:31 | 只看該作者
Game Theory and Cyber Defense,ation combining game theory and other techniques. The chapter highlights the recognized challenges associated with the applicability of game theory in the cyber world. It discusses how the game-theoretic formalism can be adapted to obtain sound solutions in a reasonable time.
29#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 15:47:34 | 只看該作者
A LQ Vaccine Communication Game, its profit. To pursue their objectives, the two players run suitable vaccination advertising campaigns. We study the open-loop Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the two players and observe that the communication policy of the pharmaceutical firm helps the health-care system to decrease the number of unvaccinated people.
30#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 19:54:50 | 只看該作者
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