Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

incontestable

書目名稱Games in Management Science影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Games in Management Science影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Games in Management Science網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Games in Management Science網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Games in Management Science被引頻次




書目名稱Games in Management Science被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Games in Management Science年度引用




書目名稱Games in Management Science年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Games in Management Science讀者反饋




書目名稱Games in Management Science讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

消瘦

regale

The Effects of Consumer Rebates in a Competitive Distribution Channel,acturer, two-retailer channel and develop a two-period model where consumers’ preferences are distributed along a Hotelling line. The rebate consists in a price discount that can be redeemed on the second period. We solve three Stackelberg games: a benchmark where no rebate is offered, a symmetric g

稀釋前

On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising,cally integrated firms, whenever this is efficient for firms. This is particularly relevant when the vertical externality provokes distortions in the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D or advertising. The present model illustrates the possibility of using two-part tariffs endogenously defined as lin

nostrum

Product Recalls and Channel Pricing, strategies in marketing channels. By doing so, we analyze whether vendor agreements between manufacturers and retailers, which are signed before any unit is sold, could distort channel profits by aggravating double marginalization. We characterize the equilibrium pricing strategies in closed form f

Pander

Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns,e selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively

Pander

A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime, a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where . coalitions exist and behave as . players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperati

最小

NUDGE

constitutional

Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition,dying how environmental emissions and tax payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from profit maximization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are compared depending on whether the upstream supplier precommits to a fixed input price or adopts a fle