Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; 8th International EA Konstantin Avrachenkov,Longbo Huang,Anastasios Gio Conference proceedings 2019 ICST Institut

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Bargaining in Networks with Socially-Aware Agentsese new stability notions admit intuitive interpretations touching on . agents. Overall, our contributions are meant to identify natural and desirable bargaining outcomes as well as to characterize powerful positions in bargaining networks.

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Conference proceedings 2019nce, in April 2019.. The 8 full and 3 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 17 submissions. They are organized in the following topical sections: Game Theory for Wireless Networks; Games for Economy and Resource Allocation; and Game Theory for Social Networks..

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12196-2traints. We have succeeded in showing that the utilities satisfy the property of diagonal strict concavity (DSC), which can be viewed as an extension of concavity to a game setting. It not only guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium but also of the normalized equilibrium.

含糊其辭

Two-Level Cooperation in Network Games allocate the value in two steps using the Shapley value and show the difference with the classical one-step allocation procedure. We then adopt this approach for games with pairwise interactions and provide relations between several definitions of the characteristic function and the corresponding Shapley values.

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