Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; 8th International EA Konstantin Avrachenkov,Longbo Huang,Anastasios Gio Conference proceedings 2019 ICST Institut

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書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋




書目名稱Game Theory for Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

Gerontology

Games and Random Searche properties of random search algorithms. Specifically using this technique in the context of Game Theory we show that stochastic better response dynamics, where players in the potential game perform their moves independently choosing the random strategy improving their outcome, converges in stochas

安定

Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanismsed over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization problem, called the system problem, to find the optimal lottery allocation. The system problem exhibits a two-layer structure comprised of a permutation profile and optimal allocations given the permutation pro

RODE

Metamorphosis

Using Bankruptcy Rules to Allocate CO2 Emission PermitsCO2 emissions permits is higher than what the planet can sustain. This situation can be considered as a bankruptcy problem, where the sum of players’ claims exceeds the endowment of the resource. In this paper, we use an approach based on bankruptcy solutions (in particular, on the Weighted Constrai

放牧

The Economics of Bundling Content with Unlicensed Wireless Service risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an

放牧

強(qiáng)壯

Bargaining in Networks with Socially-Aware Agentsle graphs, and for bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are packing-type. Our results are threefold. First, we study bargaining games whose underlying combinatorial optimization problems are .. Second, we extend the study of stability notions when the networks are in

陶器

Consensus Reaching with Heterogeneous User Preferencesile minimizing the cost paid to the platform. Prosumers, who have the possibility to generate energy, self-consume part of it to maximize their usage benefit and sell the rest to the platform to maximize their revenue. Product differentiation is introduced and consumers can specify preferences regar

Paradox

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9983-5. On top of the platform, a trust-based mechanism combining exploitation of nodes with good reputation and exploration of new nodes, is implemented to determine the miner node which validates the transactions. A case study is provided to analyze the impact of preferences and miner selection dynamic