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Titlebook: Game Theory; An Introduction with Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Mu?oz-Garcia Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s),

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樓主: CK828
41#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 18:36:25 | 只看該作者
,Nash Equilibria in?Games with?Continuous Action Spaces,ete, action spaces, such as firms choosing how much output to produce, which price to set for their products, or how much to invest in advertising. A similar argument applies to other social sciences, such as the political platform that candidates choose when they run for office, or how much each donor contributes to a charity.
42#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 21:04:17 | 只看該作者
43#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 00:41:47 | 只看該作者
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,ayers are uninformed about some piece of information, such as auctions where every bidder privately observes her valuation for the object on sale but does not observe the valuation that other bidders assign to the object.
44#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 06:26:37 | 只看該作者
Textbook 2023undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory...Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information modelsas well as signaling games..
45#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 07:50:24 | 只看該作者
46#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 14:55:02 | 只看該作者
Jeffrey M. Lehman,Michael S. Blaiss labor-market signaling game, we found th at a PBE where no worker type acquires education can be supported if, upon observing the surprising event of an educated worker, the firm believes she must be of low productivity.
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 18:21:03 | 只看該作者
Equilibrium Refinements, labor-market signaling game, we found th at a PBE where no worker type acquires education can be supported if, upon observing the surprising event of an educated worker, the firm believes she must be of low productivity.
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 23:05:33 | 只看該作者
to different settings in economics, business, and more.Suppl.An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples..?..This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides “tools” or “recipes” to solve different classes
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 02:07:26 | 只看該作者
50#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 07:12:15 | 只看該作者
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