Titlebook: Game Theory; An Introduction with Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Mu?oz-Garcia Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s),

臨時(shí)抱佛腳

Signaling Games with Continuous Messages, firm). More general settings, however, may allow for the sender to choose her message from a continuous action space (e.g., years of education, .) and, similarly, the receiver to respond with a continuous action (e.g., a wage .).

maintenance

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先鋒派

,Nash Equilibria in?Games with?Continuous Action Spaces,s). While helpful to understand the notion of best response in simultaneous-move games, many economic settings allow for continuous, rather than discrete, action spaces, such as firms choosing how much output to produce, which price to set for their products, or how much to invest in advertising. A

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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,hese games, we show that this solution concept would yield several equilibrium outcomes, thus not being very precise. More importantly, several NEs in this type of game are based on beliefs that cannot be credible in a dynamic setting.

高貴領(lǐng)導(dǎo)

Repeated Games,ral rounds, which are known as “repeated games.” In real life, agents often interact for long periods of time, facing the same institutional or industry characteristics in each period (i.e., the same “rules of the game”). In this respect, repeated games can help us describe many observed settings an

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使糾纏

支形吊燈

Equilibrium Refinements, role of education in the labor market, to pricing strategies seeking to deter firms’ entry in an industry, to car warranties by new automakers operating in a market. However, we found that this class of games may yield a large number of PBEs and, more importantly, some of these equilibria can only

extemporaneous