Titlebook: Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions; Amnon Rapoport Book 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990 USA.bargaining.competition.conflic

啞劇

degradation

Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Complete Information function, but the starting number of bullets available to each player in the dyad was varied systematically. The results of this experiment are analyzed and discussed in terms of variables that relate to predictions arising from the mathematical theory of duels.

變化

Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargainingst offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.

dissent

GUILE

,Anzeigepflicht bei Verkrüppelungen,ing a silent version (where unsuccessful fire is unknown to the opponent). Several game-theoretic implications were tested, some of which demonstrate the efficacy of the theory of games of timing as an explicatory mechanism for decision behavior in experimental duels.

商店街

Gesetzgebung und Verwaltungsrechtgle payoff vector for a given coalition structure, but supported the recently developed single-parameter a-power model that allows range predictions. Both the degree of power and type of communication were found to affect game outcomes and to determine the predictive power of models that make point predictions in 3-person games.

集合

Intractable

Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung,en tested with ideological proximity measures from 52 parliament members, reporters, and students of political science collected immediately after the 1981 elections to the tenth Israeli Knesset but before the formation of a coalition government. Theoretical implications of the model are briefly discussed.

猛然一拉

樣式