Titlebook: Epistemic Pluralism; Annalisa Coliva,Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen Book 2017 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under ex

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Data Structures for Combinatorial Problems,ese epistemic notions in their criticisms or defenses of the idea that intuitions have a positive evidential status. I argue, however, that epistemic concepts like . are ill-suited for evaluations of our philosophical methodologies. The epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are separ

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Guaranteed Cost Control for Delayed GRNsternative epistemic systems” that are all equally correct. Boghossian claims to find this view in Richard Rorty’s discussion of the conflict between Galileo and the Catholic Church. Boghossian challenges this commitment by arguing that Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine did not use epistemic systems th

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L. Szilágyi,S. M. Szilágyi,Z. Benyó different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems’, but (ii) ‘no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others’. Embracing the former claim is more or less uncontroversial—viz. a descriptive fact about epistemic diversity. The latter claim, by contrast, is ve

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Lixian Zhang,Ting Yang,Peng Shi,Yanzheng Zhuht relate to each other. In this chapter, I focus on doxastic disagreements. I examine four different ways that doxastic disagreement can present itself: descriptive disagreement, conceptual disagreement, full disagreement and credal disagreement. Pluralism is one way to resolve issues concerning do

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Palgrave Innovations in Philosophyhttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/313311.jpg

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