Titlebook: Epistemic Entitlement; The Right to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen Book 2014 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement被引頻次




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement年度引用




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement讀者反饋




書目名稱Epistemic Entitlement讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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A Default and Challenge Model of Perceptual Entitlement,l entitlement is grounded in default conditions consisting broadly in a subject being in a perceptual situation such that other participants of the epistemic practice may reasonably assume that the subject is reliable in producing true perceptual beliefs about the matter in question. As a result of

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Perceptual Knowledge,f theses about epistemic entitlements from the current literature and departed from it by construing epistemic entitlement in terms of the publicly observable conditions that ground it rather than as a (weakly) internalist epistemic status. While the standard account regards perceptual states as a p

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hardheaded

Concluding Remarks,ws that, say, there are plenty of onions in the cupboard is to refer to the knower’s perceptual situation by saying something like ‘Well, she just looked into the cupboard.’ Attributions of perceptual knowledge are normally based on the attributee being in the right kind of position to tell, while t

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Concluding Remarks,ked into the cupboard.’ Attributions of perceptual knowledge are normally based on the attributee being in the right kind of position to tell, while there is no requirement to find out whether the epistemic subject is factually reliable, or whether she is able to justify her belief, or is in a certain sort of perceptual state.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-07082-5fulfilling default conditions, the subject is not required to justify her belief in order to be entitled to it. So the default conditions are first and foremost conditions for being non-accidentally entitled.