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Titlebook: Dynamic Alliance Auctions; A Mechanism for Inte Tobias Ihde Book 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004 Auctions.Demand Aggregation.Ex

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 20:04:40 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Dynamic Alliance Auctions
副標(biāo)題A Mechanism for Inte
編輯Tobias Ihde
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/284/283502/283502.mp4
概述Includes supplementary material:
叢書(shū)名稱(chēng)Contributions to Management Science
圖書(shū)封面Titlebook: Dynamic Alliance Auctions; A Mechanism for Inte Tobias Ihde Book 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004 Auctions.Demand Aggregation.Ex
描述1.1 Motivation Today‘s transportation market is far from perfect. Market participants have admission only to a certain fraction of the market and price formation lacks transparency. However, this state is no law of nature since in principle, all market participants could manage to get together somehow and do business - but gaining new business partners beyond existing bonds usually takes too high efforts. After all, the items in transportation markets are usually traded under extreme time pressure: transportation orders have fixed pick-up and delivery deadlines and free transportation capacity cannot be used thereafter. Here, Internet-based freight markets promise help. Since the early 1990s many of such markets have come into existence so that a considerable number ex- ists today. For Germany alone, over 50 different electronic transportation marketplaces are listed in a database hosted at the University at Bremen (2001). The mediation models of these marketplaces are quite diverse (cp.
出版日期Book 2004
關(guān)鍵詞Auctions; Demand Aggregation; Experimental Economics; Internet; Internet-Based Marketplaces; Transport; Tr
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57430-6
isbn_softcover978-3-7908-0098-2
isbn_ebook978-3-642-57430-6Series ISSN 1431-1941 Series E-ISSN 2197-716X
issn_series 1431-1941
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004
The information of publication is updating

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Efficiency, Payoff, and Bidsdified private value framework is given in Section 7.2. Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 explore Dynamic Alliance auctions alongside this framework. Section 7.3 treats two special cases and shows that Nash equilibria with plausible outcomes do exist for them. Afterwards, Section 7.4 develops a formal repr
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Experimentgnificant. Average payoffs could be found significantly lower in treatments where subjects knew their distribution (differences depend on the value section considered). Differences in bidding behavior also existed. Bidding behavior was investigated using bid-to-value ratios, which directly indicate
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Putting Insights to Practicenet-based spot markets, it is simple and it imposes no extra effort on shippers. This mechanism is called . Dynamic Alliance auctions were developed for DaimlerChrysler’s Internet-based freight marketplace (Fleetboard (2002)). The aim was to provide this marketplace with an unprecedent service.
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Experimentetween T2 and T4 were detected for high values: T4-subjects submitted significantly lower bids than T2-subjects. In both treatments T3 and T4, different distributions of subjects (D1-D6) respond to different degrees of competition for complementary orders. Intuitive bidding (according to B50 , BT ,
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