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Titlebook: Differential Information Economies; Dionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. Yannelis Book 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005 Differenti

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樓主: Coarctation
31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 22:24:14 | 只看該作者
Applying Part III to the Real World of Workisk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of ., which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 02:24:37 | 只看該作者
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 08:07:23 | 只看該作者
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 12:55:06 | 只看該作者
Re-Imagining Curricula in Global TimesWe focus on the private core (Yannelis [19]) of an economy with a finite number of agents with differential information, a continuum of states and an infinite number of commodities. We state a nonemptiness result for the private core and provide a proof based on a fixed-point argument.
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 15:10:45 | 只看該作者
The core of an economy with differential informationWe introduce a new core concept for an exchange economy with differential information which is contained in the coarse core concept of Wilson (1978). We prove the existence of (i) a core allocation for an exchange economy with differential information and; (ii) an .-core strategy for a game in normal form with differential information.
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 17:53:11 | 只看該作者
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 22:55:38 | 只看該作者
1431-8849 answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of?stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.?978-3-642-05977-3978-3-540-26979-3Series ISSN 1431-8849 Series E-ISSN 2196-9930
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 02:45:18 | 只看該作者
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 08:17:58 | 只看該作者
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 11:43:47 | 只看該作者
Information, efficiency, and the core of an economyates that a market process may fail to yield an efficient allocation. In fact, in this example the market allocation is not even individually rational for the agents. Also, in this example the core is empty if there are opportunities for communication which disrupt arrangements for mutual insurance.
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