Titlebook: Differential Information Economies; Dionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. Yannelis Book 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005 Differenti

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90445-6orem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in t

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Corral

Engineering Rural Development for Africaomy is “irreducible”, then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the “private core” (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the “weak fine core” of an economy coincides with the set of competitive a

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Korea’s Path of Development in Retrospectress are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in th

LASH

Re-Inventing Africa‘s Developmentrivate information, ., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (c

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Prelude: Psychology in Metamorphosis,ore strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players’ alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. No

放棄

Marc Antoine Campill,Enno von Fircksay be risk averse and need not be identical. We consider two different verification technology specifications. When the verification technology is deterministic, we show that the optimal contract is a multilateral debt contract in the sense that the monitoring set is a lower interval. When the verif