Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 6th International Co MHR Khouzani,Emmanouil Panaousis,George Theodorako Conference proceedings 2015

Carcinoma

Making the Most of Our Regrets: Regret-Based Solutions to Handle Payoff Uncertainty and Elicitation irst contribution, this paper, for the first time, provides validation of the aforementioned adversary behavioral models based on real-world data from a wildlife park in Uganda. Our second contribution addresses situations where real-world data is not precise enough to determine exact payoffs in GSG

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Anecdote

Conference proceedings 2015rs, and much more. Combined with our classical approach to computer and network security, and drawing from various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security"...

OCTO

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33966-1de responses, as well as the case where the adversary identifies decoys via differences in protocol implementations between decoy and real nodes. Second, we formulate games with an adversary who attempts to find a real node in a network consisting of real and decoy nodes, where the time to detect wh

jungle

Cpr951

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42999-1ended by any other agent. We analyze this strategy via a passivity-based approach and formulate sufficient conditions for the probability distribution of the set of defended targets to converge to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We then derive bounds on the deviation between the utility of the system pri

SLAG

patriarch

Xuan Tho Dang,Manh Hung Le,Nam Anh Daoly encountered problems of spam email and the security of wireless networks as examples, we demonstrate how different notions of deterrence can complement well-developed models of defence, as well as provide insights into how individuals can overcome conflicting security advice. We use dynamic games