Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 6th International Co MHR Khouzani,Emmanouil Panaousis,George Theodorako Conference proceedings 2015

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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




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FORGO

Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environmentsre to better understand the timing of actions to audit, clean, or otherwise mitigate such attacks. However, to the best of our knowledge, the modern literature on games shares a common limitation: the assumption that the cost and effectiveness of the players’ actions are time-independent. In practic

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corpus-callosum

A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resourcesbilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize game theory to understand the fundamental trade-offs involved. Previous works in this direction, however, mainly focus on the single-node case without considering strict resource constraints. In this paper, a g

CUMB

Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Gamesselects an optimal attack strategy. Applications of SSG include critical infrastructure protection and dynamic defense of computer networks. Current work focuses on centralized algorithms for computing stochastic, mixed-strategy equilibria and translating those equilibria into security policies, whi

CUMB

sperse

Interdependent Security Games Under Behavioral Probability Weighting players. In contrast to much of the existing work that considers risk neutral players in such games, we investigate the impacts of behavioral probability weighting by players while making security investment decisions. This weighting captures the transformation of objective probabilities into perce

Medley

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