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Titlebook: Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment; Carlo Carraro,Jerzy A. Filar Conference proceedings 1995 Springer Science+Business M

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31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 23:10:19 | 只看該作者
Pollution-Induced Business Cycles: A Game Theoretical Analysis government imposes a tax and uses the tax proceeds for pollution abatement operations. The feedback of pollution on capital accumulation and the effect of the level of pollution on the natural rate of decay are incorporated in the model. We solve for the (subgame perfect) feedback Nash equilibrium
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 01:19:09 | 只看該作者
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 09:08:26 | 只看該作者
Sustainable International Agreements on Greenhouse Warming — A Game Theory Studynor, and in the other coalition we may have countries that suffer from the global warming. The greenhouse problem is modelled as an economic infinite-horizon differential game. The players negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient programs. Since the costs of one player will be reduced in cooper
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 11:02:41 | 只看該作者
Taxation and Environmental Innovation (time of innovation, innovation subsidy) such to induce firms to behave optimally The proposed policy-mix (environmental tax and innovation subsidy) is shown to reduce emissions more, and to reduce output less, than environmental policies based on a single policy instrument.
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 16:34:48 | 只看該作者
Christopher Dorn,Veronika Tackenor, and in the other coalition we may have countries that suffer from the global warming. The greenhouse problem is modelled as an economic infinite-horizon differential game. The players negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient programs. Since the costs of one player will be reduced in cooper
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 20:20:27 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17974-8 (time of innovation, innovation subsidy) such to induce firms to behave optimally The proposed policy-mix (environmental tax and innovation subsidy) is shown to reduce emissions more, and to reduce output less, than environmental policies based on a single policy instrument.
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 23:12:26 | 只看該作者
Conference proceedings 1995ature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze‘s introductory chapter. Fur- thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy- namics. Several diverse proble
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 02:52:40 | 只看該作者
The ESS Maximum Principle as a Tool for Modeling and Managing Biological Systems
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 08:07:41 | 只看該作者
Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 11:49:58 | 只看該作者
2474-0179 s use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy- namics. Several diverse proble978-1-4612-6917-5978-1-4612-0841-9Series ISSN 2474-0179 Series E-ISSN 2474-0187
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