Titlebook: Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment; Carlo Carraro,Jerzy A. Filar Conference proceedings 1995 Springer Science+Business M

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17974-8n. Environmental quality is modelled in two different ways: (i) as a given stock which is damaged by a flow of pollution; and (ii) as a renewable resource which is used as an input in production. After a brief discussion of pollution, taxation and the cost of public funds, attention is focused on re

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Verdachtsarbeit im Kinderschutz of these products by choosing their output-emission ratios. Cleaner products are assumed to be more costly to develop than dirty products. Using an extension of the expanding variety product of Helpman and Grossman, we investigate and compare the effects of emission taxes and technological standard

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18261-8he firms have access to a technology which allows one to regulate the quality of capital instantaneously through a lump-sum maintenance expenditure which applies only when the state variable hits a predetermined minimum quality standard. In a partial equilibrium framework (single firm and a long-run

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18341-7er 1992 the establishment of an intergovernmental U.N. Conference on Highly Migratory and Straddling Stocks, which was scheduled to hold its first full session in July 1993. The conference is to address a critical issue in the management of transboundary fishery resources, namely the management of f

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Algebra: K?rper- und Galois-Theorie government imposes a tax and uses the tax proceeds for pollution abatement operations. The feedback of pollution on capital accumulation and the effect of the level of pollution on the natural rate of decay are incorporated in the model. We solve for the (subgame perfect) feedback Nash equilibrium

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18449-0imposes environmental levies on the polluters whose economic activity, otherwise beneficial for the region, results in pollution of the stream. The model for the problem of effluent management is formulated as a dynamic game between the . and the polluters. The game is “played” in discrete time. The

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Differential Game Models of Global Environmental Management of their own economic processes but have to achieve jointly a common environmental management goal. The paper is organized in two parts treating of modeling issues related to process dynamics and players interactions respectively. In the first part we discuss the control theoretic approach for repr

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