Titlebook: Consumer-Driven Demand and Operations Management Models; A Systematic Study o Christopher S. Tang,Serguei Netessine Book 2009 Springer-Verl

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-04118-2k faced by customers. We analyze the firm’s optimal capacity choice in two different scenarios. In one case, customers can perfectly anticipate fill rates; in the other case, customers do not have fully rational expectations and they learn about availability through experience. We investigate, for b

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Cheap Talk in Operations: Role of Intentional Vaguenessions (that is, in service settings whether to join or balk, and whether to buy or wait in retail), and the firm as strategic in the way it provides the information. The customers and the firm are assumed to be self-interested in making their decisions: the firm in choosing which announcements to mak

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Internet-Based Distribution Channel for Product Diversion with Potential Manufacturer’s Interventiontailers and manufacturer can collectively influence future demand level and the equilibrium unit price in the secondary market. We assume a large number of retailers, an assumption that is appropriate for an Internet-based market. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that all retailers are id

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Is Assortment Selection a Popularity Contest?el, with the first stage involving a product choice, and the second stage involving a keep-or-return decision. We show that the structure of the optimal assortment strongly depends on both the return policy, which we parameterize by refund fraction (percentage of price refunded upon return) and the

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Selling to Strategic Customers: Opaque Selling Strategieslability in the opaque market, keeping in mind that demand is uncertain and product supply could be limited. This model helps illustrate the conditions under which opaque selling can increase firm profits. We conclude the chapter by discussing ongoing research and charting out future research direct

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Competing Through Mass Customizationproducts does not carry inventory, it makes-to-order and its customers incur waiting costs until they receive their orders. Our results are useful for characterizing conditions that favor custom and standard products under competition. We find that the value of mass customization critically depends