Titlebook: Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution; Denis Fisette Book 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

LINE

David G. Haglund,Charles C. Pentlandby Rosenthal (1986, 1990, 1993, 1994), from a pair of objections recently advanced by Dretske (1993; 1995). According to the version of the “higherorder thought” (henceforth HOT) theory of conscious states which I have in mind, none of my mental states will be a conscious state unless I am conscious

招募

intoxicate

華而不實

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14743-4onality. But we seem to be able to use representations without being conscious of them. For example, blindsighted people may have no conscious access to representations while actually using them. Consciousness is also inseparable from the notion of quale: the phenomenal qualitative look or flavor of

嚴峻考驗

Combined axial and bending stresses,tself. When we have a hallucinatory vision of a tomato, however, there may be present to us no red and round physical object. Still, we use the words ‘red’ and ‘round’ to describe that situation as well, this time applying them to the visual experience itself. We say that we have a red, round visual

是限制

Foundations and retaining walls, to anything else. These philosophers also typically consider that the existence of qualia is sufficient to doom physicalist or functionalist approaches to the mind. Supporters of qualia elimination are to be found at the opposite end of the spectrum. They deny that mental states and events actually

dithiolethione

剛開始

胎兒

Neonatal

The General Theory in an Open Economyon’s having a particular meaning. .theories, for example, identify the meaning of a mental representation with the cause of its tokening in certain specifiable circumstances... theories hold that the meaning of a mental representation is determined by its biological function, what it was selected fo