Titlebook: Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution; Denis Fisette Book 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Conscious Intentionalityds which they are directed or are about. Consciousness does not possess intentionality, then, if it is possible to be conscious without being conscious of anything. This is one of the few issues in the philosophy of mind that can rightly be settled by introspection; it is clear from conscious experi

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Consciousness as Valued Procedural Mode of Apprehensiononality. But we seem to be able to use representations without being conscious of them. For example, blindsighted people may have no conscious access to representations while actually using them. Consciousness is also inseparable from the notion of quale: the phenomenal qualitative look or flavor of

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Filling-In : Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perceptioner and above the content of the visual judgements we are disposed to make. As he puts it in his book .: “There is no such phenomenon as really seeming — over and above the phenomenon of judging in one way or another that something is the case” (1991, p. 364). I think that this is wrong: there is a d

Metastasis

Perception, Particulars and Predicatesnd indirect? Each of these questions has been the subject of recent discussion. In what follows I set out one answer to each of them and explore some of the ways these answers support and complement each other. The answers adopted are: to perceive — and I shall normally only have in mind visual perc

疏忽

Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Mindscities include the ability to describe each other in intentional terms, the capacity to produce and assess explanations couched in intentional terms, and the capacity to predict other people’s behavior. It’s easy to see why these capacities have generated such interest, for they are the means by whi

irreparable

Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determinationon’s having a particular meaning. .theories, for example, identify the meaning of a mental representation with the cause of its tokening in certain specifiable circumstances... theories hold that the meaning of a mental representation is determined by its biological function, what it was selected fo