Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 15th International S Panagiotis Kanellopoulos,Maria Kyropoulou,Alexandr Conference proceedings 2022 The Editor(s)

落葉劑

On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for?Crowdsourcing Marketsasks, for which we provide a truthful FPTAS. Finally, we also highlight connections of our problem with other well-studied optimization problems, out of which, we infer further conclusions on its (in)approximability.

包租車船

Simultaneous Contests with?Equal Sharing Allocation of?Prizes: Computational Complexity and?Price ofputing a best response is NP-hard. For natural restricted versions where best response is easy to compute, we show that finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, and finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is (PPAD.PLS)-complete. On the other hand, an approximate pure-strategy Nash

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陳腐思想

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9493-6s with affine demand two firms can never lose more than 1/9 of their profit when merging, and this bound is tight. We also study the asymptotic loss in larger markets, where it is easy to show that the profit loss can be arbitrarily large when multiple firms merge; we give bounds that characterize t

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粗魯性質(zhì)

Durchsetzung auf nationaler Ebeneasks, for which we provide a truthful FPTAS. Finally, we also highlight connections of our problem with other well-studied optimization problems, out of which, we infer further conclusions on its (in)approximability.

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