Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 9th International Co Yiling Chen,Nicole Immorlica Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem, partition scheme that maximizes the resulting partition value. A partition scheme . consists of a partition . of [.] for each row . of the matrix. The partition . can be interpreted as a smoothing operator on row ., which replaces the value of each entry in that row with the expected value in the p

Exclaim

Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3,irement that every pure strategy used with positive probability must have payoff within . of the best response payoff. Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [8] conjectured that every win-lose bimatrix game has a .-well-supported Nash equilibrium that uses supports of cardinality at most three. Indeed

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The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship,n also allowing indifferences, . is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that retains both properties. . has been particularly successful in the special domain of random assignment where indifferences are unavoidable. While . . is obviously feasible, we show that . the resulting probab

軌道

Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments,dual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local

地名表

Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments,dual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local