Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 9th International Co Yiling Chen,Nicole Immorlica Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

floaters

Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods,Bayesian settings for facility location problems on graphs where no agent can be excluded from using a facility that has been constructed. We show that the optimization problem involved in implementing the revenue optimal mechanism is hard to approximate within a factor of Ω(. .) (assuming .?≠?.) ev

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Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods,Bayesian settings for facility location problems on graphs where no agent can be excluded from using a facility that has been constructed. We show that the optimization problem involved in implementing the revenue optimal mechanism is hard to approximate within a factor of Ω(. .) (assuming .?≠?.) ev

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On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games,d by Mirrokni et al. [10], correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.

Hiatus

Trading Agent Kills Market Information,rs and computer algorithms interact. Because humans and computers differ in their capabilities to emit and process complex market signals, there is a need to understand the determinants of the provision of market information. We tackle the general research question from the perspective of new electr

Salivary-Gland

Trading Agent Kills Market Information,rs and computer algorithms interact. Because humans and computers differ in their capabilities to emit and process complex market signals, there is a need to understand the determinants of the provision of market information. We tackle the general research question from the perspective of new electr

Minutes

insurgent

Designing Markets for Daily Deals,onsumers. In order to maximize consumer acquisition and retention, these platforms would like to offer deals that give good value to users. Currently, selecting such deals is done manually; however, the large number of submarkets and localities necessitates an automatic approach to selecting good de

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Interim

The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,ng the exact complexity of computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted solution since attention was drawn to it in 2004. In this paper, I settle this question by proving that deciding the existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is .-complete.