Titlebook: Vascular Mechanics and Pathology; Mano J. Thubrikar Textbook 2007 Springer-Verlag US 2007 biomedical engineering.cardiovascular.endotheliu

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書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology影響因子(影響力)學科排名




書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學科排名




書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology被引頻次




書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology被引頻次學科排名




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ediate reward functions, representing either individual payoffs in a multiagent problem or rewards with respect to different objectives. In this context, we focus on the determination of a policy that fairly shares regrets among agents or objectives, the regret being defined on each dimension as the

小淡水魚

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gotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we pre

雄辯

which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much. We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. Also, we present an analysis for uniformly random alloca

HACK

arbitrary, valuations for outcomes are convex functions in the type, and utilities over outcomes and payments are quasi-linear. Archer and Kleinberg?[1] have proven that in case of valuation functions that are linear in the type monotonicity in combination with a local integrability condition are eq

欲望

agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models the residential area to maximize their individual utility. The latter solely depends on the types of the agents on neighboring nodes and it has been a standard assumption to consider utility functions that are mo

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ell as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism i

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