Titlebook: Understanding Strategic Interaction; Essays in Honor of R Wulf Albers,Werner Güth,Eric Damme Book 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg

統(tǒng)治人類(lèi)

prediabetes

Condense

燦爛

hypnogram

Arresting

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9Entscheidungstheorie; Evolution; Industrial Economics; Spieltheorie; behavioral economics; boundary eleme

Harness

Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965–88Reinhard Selten and I first met in Princeton in 1961 at a game-theory conference sponsored by Oskar Morgenstern. The earliest thing I remember about him is that he presented an excellent paper at the conference about the difficulty of defining a value concept for games in extensive form.

Ostrich

Introduction and SurveyUnderstanding strategic interaction can be interpreted in more than one way: One is to explain interaction phenomena by modelling them as games and derive their solutions by relying on perfectly rational players. Let us refer to this as the rationalistic approach to understanding strategic interaction.

Awning

青春期