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Titlebook: Understanding Auctions; Asunción Mochón,Yago Sáez Textbook 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 Auction Mechanism.Aucti

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書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Understanding Auctions
編輯Asunción Mochón,Yago Sáez
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/942/941312/941312.mp4
概述Sets an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms.Numerous step-by-step examples help the reader to understand each auction model in detail.Large number of examples of real-world auction
叢書(shū)名稱(chēng)Springer Texts in Business and Economics
圖書(shū)封面Titlebook: Understanding Auctions;  Asunción Mochón,Yago Sáez Textbook 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 Auction Mechanism.Aucti
描述.In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book?is?to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic..Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book,?the authors?summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic..“This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” .Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University..
出版日期Textbook 2015
關(guān)鍵詞Auction Mechanism; Auction Models; Auctions; Game Theory; Market Design
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6
isbn_softcover978-3-319-36085-0
isbn_ebook978-3-319-08813-6Series ISSN 2192-4333 Series E-ISSN 2192-4341
issn_series 2192-4333
copyrightSpringer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
The information of publication is updating

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Assigning Multiple Homogeneous Items in a Single Auction,. For example, if an olive oil factory wants to sell part of its stock, it can choose to conduct an auction. The items to be auctioned may be homogeneous (oil bottles of the same size and acidity) or heterogeneous (different sizes and acidities) and may be awarded in a single auction or in different auctions.
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Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions,ngle auction, in which the bidders are allowed to bid for the items or combinations of items that they want. These auctions are particularly suitable when substitutes and complements items are auctioned, because the risk of aggregation or exposure is reduced.
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Auction Basics,An . is a market mechanism, operating under specific rules, that determines to whom one or more items will be awarded and at what price.
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Double Auctions,In the auctions analyzed to this point, we have assumed that there is only one seller and many bidders, in which the seller acts as a monopolist (.). However, the main characteristic of a . is that multiple buyers and sellers interact; it is a ..
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