| 書目名稱 | The Social Contract of the Firm |
| 副標(biāo)題 | Economics, Ethics an |
| 編輯 | Lorenzo Sacconi |
| 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/920/919852/919852.mp4 |
| 概述 | This book presents a theory of moral norms and codes of ethics seen as the resolution of decision problems and games situations involving incompleteness of contracts and unforeseen contingencies withi |
| 叢書名稱 | Ethical Economy |
| 圖書封面 |  |
| 描述 | In order to survive as a social institution a firm needs a constitutional social contract, even though implicit, among its stakeholders. This social contract must exist if an institution is to be justified. The book focuses on two main issues: To find out the terms of the hypothetical agreement among the firm‘s stakeholders in an ex ante perspective and to understand the endogenous mechanism generating appropriate incentives that induce to comply with the social contract itself, as seen in the ex post perspective. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2000 |
| 關(guān)鍵詞 | Codes of Ethics; Games of Reputation; Incomplete Contracts; Social Contract; ethics; fuzzy sets; issue; log |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57300-2 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-63135-1 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-57300-2Series ISSN 2211-2707 Series E-ISSN 2211-2723 |
| issn_series | 2211-2707 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000 |
|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋|
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