| 書目名稱 | The Justification of Scientific Change | | 編輯 | Carl R. Kordig | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/913/912572/912572.mp4 | | 叢書名稱 | Synthese Library | | 圖書封面 |  | | 描述 | In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con- sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in- vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace- ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for ra | | 出版日期 | Book 1971 | | 關鍵詞 | Theory of Meaning; falsification; invariance; philosophy of science; reduction; science | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1734-3 | | isbn_softcover | 978-90-277-0475-7 | | isbn_ebook | 978-94-010-1734-3Series ISSN 0166-6991 Series E-ISSN 2542-8292 | | issn_series | 0166-6991 | | copyright | Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1971 |
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