| 書目名稱 | The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods | | 編輯 | Conny Rhode | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/906/905535/905535.mp4 | | 概述 | Empirically, the goal of analytic philosophical debates is not truth but mere persuasion.Logical inference barriers are recast as persuasion barriers.All metaphysics breaches such barriers and must be | | 圖書封面 |  | | 描述 | .Who carries the burden of proof in analytic philosophical debates, and how can this burden be satisfied? As it turns out, the answer to this joint question yields a fundamental challenge to the very conduct of metaphysics in analytic philosophy...Empirical research presented in this book indicates that the vastly predominant goal pursued in analytic philosophical dialogues lies not in discovering truths or generating knowledge, but merely in prevailing over one’s opponents. Given this goal, the book examines how most effectively to allocate and discharge the burden of proof. It focuses on premises that must prudently be avoided because a burden of proof on them could never be satisfied, and in particular discusses unsupportable bridge premises across inference barriers, like Hume’s barrier between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, or the barrier between the content of our talk or thought, and the world beyond such content...Employing this content/world barrier for a critical assessment of mainstream analytic philosophical methods, this book argues that we must prudently avoid invoking intuitions or other content of thought or talk in support of claims about the world beyond content, that is, meta | | 出版日期 | Book 2023 | | 關(guān)鍵詞 | Metaphysics; Inference barriers; Hume; Philosophical Methods; Empiricism | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27777-1 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-031-27779-5 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-031-27777-1 | | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl |
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