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Titlebook: Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information; Information Sharing Guido Voigt Book 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2

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書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information
副標(biāo)題Information Sharing
編輯Guido Voigt
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/883/882018/882018.mp4
概述Managerial insights on the impact of information sharing and contract complexity.The interaction between trust, trustworthiness and information sharing strategies.Setup cost reduction in case of asymm
叢書(shū)名稱(chēng)Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
圖書(shū)封面Titlebook: Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information; Information Sharing Guido Voigt Book 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2
描述Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
出版日期Book 2011
關(guān)鍵詞Behavioral Experiments; Information Sharing; Just-in-Time Strategies; Screening Contracts; Supply Chain
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20132-5
isbn_softcover978-3-642-20131-8
isbn_ebook978-3-642-20132-5Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
issn_series 0075-8442
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011
The information of publication is updating

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Introduction,each supply chain party. However, if the legally independent supply chain members deliberately exploit the supply chain counterpart to enhance own financial ratios, then the implementation of a specific concept is likely to fail, as long as there are no mechanisms avoiding the pitfalls of opportunis
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Conclusion and Outlook,.1 gave a brief and general introduction into principal–agent models under asymmetric information. These models were classified into moral hazard and adverse selection problem. Afterwards, one approach to solve adverse selection problems, namely screening contracts, was discussed in a strategic lots
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 04:41:35 | 只看該作者
The Impact of Information Sharing on the Effectiveness of Screening Contracts: A First Laboratory Ef the buyers’ reports as well as the consistency between reports and contact choices. Afterwards, Sect.?4.6 shows the impact of the before-mentioned results on the overall supply chain performance. Finally, Sect.?4.7 summarizes the results and gives some managerial insights.
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 05:42:46 | 只看該作者
0075-8442 ion sharing strategies.Setup cost reduction in case of asymmInformation sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract term
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