Titlebook: Structural Realism; Structure, Object, a Elaine Landry,Dean Rickles Book 2012 Springer Netherlands 2012 Causation.Laws.Modality.Structural

專橫

Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-eliminative, Ontic Structural Realismade, particularly with respect to the metaphysical or “ontic” approach (OSR). In recent years, several advocates of OSR have proposed a novel understanding of it in order to side-step a serious challenge faced by its original formulation, eliminative OSR. I examine the conceptual basis of the new, n

misshapen

How , to Be a Realist view that permits epistemic access to non-structural features of unobservables but then face the daunting task of substantiating a claim that up till now has failed to deliver the goods or they can drop the problematic requirement of epistemic access to non-structural features but then face a collapse to epistemic structural realism.

incarcerate

Methodological Structural Realismre of what we say about . object as such a kind, resulting from the belief that it would be a miracle if the structure of the these kinds did not match some structure of the world. I will consider each aspect of this account in its turn.

Horizon

Time, Observables, and Structure debate over the nature of structure in discussions of structural realism (i.e. the question of how structures are to be conceived). I argue that it has both the resources to ground the notion of structure in physics and to answer the ‘no relations without relata’ objection.

FRAUD

Ontic Structural Realism and Modalityed non-circularly, it cannot offer a satisfactory account of the laws of the special sciences, and it can offer no explanation of the success of inductive inference. In addition, Humeanism fails to be naturalistically motivated. For these reasons, we conclude that the scientific realist must embrace natural necessity.

誓言

The Presentation of Objects and the Representation of Structurealists and my intention in this paper is to help clarify the situation by drawing on Brading and Landry’s distinction between the . of putative objects via the relevant ‘shared structure’ that our theories make available and the . of such objects (as features of the world) by those theories.

figment

gastritis

Underdetermination as a Path to Structural Realism show that each can and should be rejected. Moreover, the ontic structural realist program faces an analogous metaphysical underdetermination issue of its own. We conclude that the argument fails, independently of whether the alleged metaphysical underdetermination is conceded.

Debark

Admonish