Titlebook: Scissors and Rock; Game Theory for Thos Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmann Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 strategic dec

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3strategic decision problems; strategic behaviour and game theory; decision making and game theory; auct

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978-3-030-44822-6Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

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,The Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Who Are the Players?,sions. Mr. Taubman served ten months of a one-year prison sentence; Ms. Brooks was given six months’ house arrest, a $350,000 fine, and 1000?h of community service. She pleaded guilty to price-fixing and then testified against her boss, Alfred Taubman. No one was charged at Christie’s, which had blo

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Which Strategy to Choose?,cases a singleton is left. In contrast to this operation, the concept of rationalizable strategies leads to an expansion of the set of justifiable strategy choices. A strategy x is rationalizable if it is a best reply to strategy y and y is a best reply to a strategy z. In a Nash equilibrium (x, y),

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Forever and a Day,wing periods as long as the strategy of the opponent chooses “cooperate.” However, if the strategy selects “defect,” then TIT-FOR TAT presents “defect” as well. The strategy resulting in the . of payoff points wins. This condition is different than what defines success in the Iterated Prisoners’ Dil