Titlebook: Rings in Auctions; An Experimental Appr Angelo Artale Book 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997 Auktion.Experimentelle Wirtschaftsfo

PANEL

Introduction,r with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eve

Discrete

The Experiment,ion, and compare this with the observed payoff on average. As we will see, the most commonly used mechanism is not an optimal one, that is, it is not a mechanism which selects as winner the player with the highest value when players play rationally. Nevertheless, because of the bounded rationality o

或者發(fā)神韻

A Descriptive Model,s who cheat announce their values. Our aim, in this section, is to present a more general model, which assigns the conditional probability that a player cheats when he announces in the different positions, given his value and the others’ announcements. To estimate these probabilities, we use a logit

conflate

Inkling

Book 1997player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and

tooth-decay

Introduction,sappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the d

清楚說話

The Experiment,gy are described in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 reports the theory of collusion in first-price auctions with emphasis on the contribution of McAfee and McMillan (1992). Section 2.4 describes the mechanisms used by experimental subjects. That is, we describe the rules chosen by experimental subjects to

maculated

出價

Mechanisms of Collusion,ental set-up looks like (Section 4.1). Section 4.2 analyzes a particular equilibrium of the announcement mechanism, Section 4.3 the equilibria of the bid-bargain mechanism. In Subsection 4.3.1, we investigate the optimality of the bid-bargain mechanism and compare it with the announcement mechanism.

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