Titlebook: Rights for Intelligent Robots? ; A Philosophical Inqu K?stutis Mosakas Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exc

教唆

Artificial Moral Agency and Patiency,on and categorizations of moral agency, with a specific focus on the notion of “mindless morality,” which posits that AI systems can be considered as moral agents irrespective of their possession of consciousness. The chapter critiques this view by challenging its underlying assumption that machine

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Can We Detect the Presence of Mentality in a Machine?,critiques the limitations of relying solely on a singular theory of consciousness and instead advocates for a broad framework based on probabilistic reasoning. This approach considers factors such as one’s outward behavior, cognitive architecture, and evolutionary similarities to human beings (in th

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摻假

Some Moral Bases for the Legal Protection of Robots,ers the idea of granting legal personhood to sapient robots, arguing that if machines were to attain comparable cognitive capacities to humans, granting them legal rights would become a moral imperative. However, this proposal is bound to face practical challenges like the problem of other minds; he

insular

Conclusion,criterion for moral status; (2) probabilistic reasoning about the presence of mentality in other entities; (3) legal personhood and moral decisions under uncertainty; (4) moral relations and a hybrid approach to moral consideration; (5) examination of arguments against machine moral considerability;

手術(shù)刀

Book 2024f artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. Although the current machines fall short of the level of sophistication and human likeness portrayed in science fiction (e.g., the Westworld series or the movie Blade Runner 2049), they are increasingly assuming roles in our society in various important a

Nutrient

Artificial Moral Agency and Patiency,consciousness is fundamentally indeterminable. It then delves into the concept of moral patiency, addressing issues like instrumentalism and the animal-robot analogy. The chapter argues against crude instrumentalism and premature dismissal of the animal-robot analogy, given the many uncertainties surrounding the future developments in robotics.

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