Titlebook: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology; A Critique of Folk P Matthew Ratcliffe Book 2007 Matthew Ratcliffe 2007 critique.developmental psycholog

Ingrown-Toenail

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書目名稱Rethinking Commonsense Psychology讀者反饋




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巧辦法

Where is the Commonsense in Commonsense Psychology?, any training. And it arises and persists in much the same form regardless of what one might know about scientific psychology. Hence it is not a ‘pop science’ acquired by educated non-scientists but an understanding that is possessed by educated and uneducated alike.

毗鄰

孵卵器

Commonsense Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation,gers, the holders of certain social roles and statuses, neighbours, competitors, lovers, friends or family. And we interact with each other in all sorts of ways. Negotiating one’s way along a busy shopping street alongside several hundred others, with the occasional exchange of nods, smiles or frown

forager

駭人

The World We Live in,ibute beliefs and desires to other people in a vacuum. When we do so, we take for granted not only that the other person is already in a world but that we are both in the same world. Furthermore, it is not simply a matter of assuming the same shared context in every instance. Aspects of an interpret

KIN

Letting the World do the Work,is ‘deeply and almost exclusively mentalistic’. Some proponents of FP do acknowledge that other factors are important and also that such factors might facilitate some instances of social understanding and interaction without the aid of FP. For example, Botterill and Carruthers (1999), having discuss

Cumbersome

Perceiving Actions,mative, it can account not only for why an action was performed but also for why it ought to have been performed. Furthermore, it can do so without involving propositional attitudes. Not all situational understanding relates to particular actions. For example, interpretations of what commuters do ev

觀察

Embolic-Stroke

Beliefs and Desires, in shared situations, is often all we need to facilitate the level of understanding required for successful interaction and coordination. Even when we explain actions in terms of reasons, we often do so by referring to aspects of situations, rather than to psychological states. In addition to this,