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Titlebook: Representational Content and the Objects of Thought; Nicholas Rimell Book 2021 Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press 2021 mental content.con

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 19:14:20 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Representational Content and the Objects of Thought
編輯Nicholas Rimell
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/828/827444/827444.mp4
概述Ties together a variety of important questions in metaphysics, philosophy of mind , and philosophy of language.Offers an exposition of leading versions of content internalism, including David Chalmers
圖書(shū)封面Titlebook: Representational Content and the Objects of Thought;  Nicholas Rimell Book 2021 Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press 2021 mental content.con
描述.This book defends a novel view of mental representation—of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs—beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves—given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective??.The other problem is? how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem...The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions—as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes—as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of th
出版日期Book 2021
關(guān)鍵詞mental content; content internalism; content externalism; objects of thought; propositions; first-persona
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3517-5
isbn_softcover978-981-16-3519-9
isbn_ebook978-981-16-3517-5
copyrightShanghai Jiao Tong University Press 2021
The information of publication is updating

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 22:12:41 | 只看該作者
Narrow Representational Content,h this debate from subtly different debates. I then lay out the main argument for externalism. The argument’s crucial premise is . (CFT), the claim that thoughts cannot have the same representational content while differing in truth value. If CFT is true, internalism is false and externalism is true
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 04:24:27 | 只看該作者
Narrow Content and Propositions,inherit the contents of—propositions. Second, necessarily, propositions have truth values, and they have these truth values absolutely. Thus, there are no . propositions. It is commonly recognized that these two tenets jointly entail Content Fixes Truth (CFT), the claim that thoughts cannot have the
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Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents,itutively involves a thinker’s standing in a relation to an object of thought, then it is impossible to think about nonexistents. I present an argument that is clearly valid. I then argue that, to make sense of the validity of this argument, we must accept that thinking constitutively involves a rel
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