找回密碼
 To register

QQ登錄

只需一步,快速開始

掃一掃,訪問微社區(qū)

打印 上一主題 下一主題

Titlebook: Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept; Eric Damme Book 1983 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983 Nash-Gleichgewicht.Nichtkooperati

[復制鏈接]
查看: 11674|回復: 39
樓主
發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 19:36:00 | 只看該作者 |倒序瀏覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
編輯Eric Damme
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/825/824682/824682.mp4
叢書名稱Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
圖書封面Titlebook: Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept;  Eric Damme Book 1983 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983 Nash-Gleichgewicht.Nichtkooperati
描述In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self- enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba- tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine- ments;to derive charac
出版日期Book 1983
關(guān)鍵詞Nash-Gleichgewicht; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; dynamic programming; equilibrium; game theory; incomplete in
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49970-8
isbn_softcover978-3-540-12690-4
isbn_ebook978-3-642-49970-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
issn_series 0075-8442
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983
The information of publication is updating

書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept影響因子(影響力)學科排名




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學科排名




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept被引頻次




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept被引頻次學科排名




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept年度引用




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept年度引用學科排名




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept讀者反饋




書目名稱Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept讀者反饋學科排名




單選投票, 共有 1 人參與投票
 

0票 0.00%

Perfect with Aesthetics

 

1票 100.00%

Better Implies Difficulty

 

0票 0.00%

Good and Satisfactory

 

0票 0.00%

Adverse Performance

 

0票 0.00%

Disdainful Garbage

您所在的用戶組沒有投票權(quán)限
沙發(fā)
發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 21:14:12 | 只看該作者
板凳
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 00:29:20 | 只看該作者
地板
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 04:59:19 | 只看該作者
Games in Normal Form, against small perturbations in the data of the game. In this chapter, we will consider various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for this class of games, all of which require an equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition.
5#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 11:02:40 | 只看該作者
Control Costs, game, incurs costs depending on how well he chooses to control his actions. Such a game models the idea that a player can reduce the probability of making mistakes, but that he can only do so by being extra prudent, hence, by spending an extra effort, which involves some costs.The goal of the chapt
6#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 14:31:32 | 只看該作者
Incomplete Information, with incomplete information, the class of disturbed games, is studied. A disturbed game is a normal form game in which each player, although knowing his own payoff function exactly, has only imprecise information about the payoff functions of his opponents. We study such games, since we feel that i
7#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 20:09:07 | 只看該作者
8#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 23:47:20 | 只看該作者
9#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 02:35:41 | 只看該作者
10#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 06:46:57 | 只看該作者
 關(guān)于派博傳思  派博傳思旗下網(wǎng)站  友情鏈接
派博傳思介紹 公司地理位置 論文服務(wù)流程 影響因子官網(wǎng) 吾愛論文網(wǎng) 大講堂 北京大學 Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
發(fā)展歷史沿革 期刊點評 投稿經(jīng)驗總結(jié) SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系數(shù) 清華大學 Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
QQ|Archiver|手機版|小黑屋| 派博傳思國際 ( 京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-10-8 02:38
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博傳思   京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328 版權(quán)所有 All rights reserved
快速回復 返回頂部 返回列表
辉县市| 古浪县| 麦盖提县| 华亭县| 全州县| 偏关县| 凯里市| 双城市| 延津县| 西平县| 云龙县| 宜君县| 扎鲁特旗| 永吉县| 视频| 宁南县| 阳东县| 珲春市| 建平县| 收藏| 荔浦县| 中方县| 鸡东县| 黑山县| 黔西县| 宝山区| 襄垣县| 贵州省| 富川| 星子县| 赫章县| 顺平县| 浦北县| 栾城县| 乐平市| 三门峡市| 沅江市| 丽江市| 陇西县| 民丰县| 瓮安县|