Titlebook: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol 5 1970-1971: Reason & Reality; Royal Institute of Philosophy Book 1972 Palgrave Macmillan, a d

不愛(ài)防注射

Hume on What There is, seems clear that Hume changed his ontological views while writing the ., and that not just one but two different ontologies are to be found there. The ontology of Parts I, II, and III of Book I is more or less Lockean. There are minds and their operations and qualities. There are physical entities,

DEMUR

,Hume’s Concept of Truth,Selby-Bigge’s edition) he writes that ‘Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the . relations of ideas, or to . existence and matter of fact.’ Hume’s main concern in this passage, however, is not with the concept of truth,

G-spot

自負(fù)的人

,Kant’s Explanation of the Necessity of Geometrical Truths,l’. It is less extreme than Berkeley’s in two ways. First, Kant does not assert that everything which exists is essentially mental, as Berkeley does. Second, those things which he does hold to be essentially mental, he holds to be so in a weaker fashion. Nevertheless he was an idealist; he held that

Perennial長(zhǎng)期的

Schopenhauer on the Principle of Sufficient Reason,eaning than that of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is posited. Accordingly every necessity is .; absolute, i.e. unconditioned, necessity therefore is a .. For . can never mean anything but to result from a given reason.’ These words are taken from the beginning of section 49 of

揉雜

Hegel: Force and Understanding,t was published in 1807 as Volume One of his .. A second volume, he announced, would contain ‘the system of Logic as speculative philosophy, and of the other two parts of philosophy, the sciences of Nature and Spirit’. But no such volume appeared: although in 1812 his . was published as ‘the first s

臨時(shí)抱佛腳

pus840

T. H. Green and the Ethics of Self-Realisation,hat uncomplimentary opening, I do not mean to imply that Victorian England contained no competent philosophers at all. Indeed, if one considers thinkers of the second and lower ranks only, their literary productivity was probably greater than those of any previous period in English, or even British,

笨拙處理

CAJ

Hume on What There is,y that previous philosophers had held. According to this new ontology, there are only perceptions : all other sorts of things are absorbed by or reduced to these, or else simply eliminated. Berkeley had indeed assimilated bodies and the properties of bodies to perceptions, but he had kept minds as a