Titlebook: Quantitative Methoden in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften; Hans Paul Künzi zum Peter Kall,Jürg Kohlas,Carl August Zehnder (Vizepr Book 1989 S

moratorium

Pathogen

K. Kleibohmchisees. Besides independent franchise outlets, the majority of chains operates a significant number of company-owned stores run by employed store managers. The evolution and constant existence of these hybrid organizational forms cannot be explained along a pure principal-agent-view and deserves fu

Admonish

insightful

acolyte

W. J. Runggaldier,C. A. Clarotti the property rights theory we argue that the contractual mix between company-owned and franchised outlets depends on the distribution of intangible assets between the franchisor and franchisee. The more important the franchisor’s system-specific assets relative to the franchisee’s local market asse

中和

Estrogen

J. KohlasShane 1998; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual i

賄賂

無價值

- fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also

剛毅

W. Krelle,H. Sarrazin - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also