| 書(shū)目名稱 | Precaution Incentives in Accident Settings | | 編輯 | Tim Friehe | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/755/754421/754421.mp4 | | 叢書(shū)名稱 | ?konomische Analyse des Rechts | | 圖書(shū)封面 |  | | 描述 | Law and economics has been established as an important sub-discipline of economics. Looking at the ?eld, it is undisputed that the economics of tort law has been the subject of much study early on and continues to be. The analysis in that realm is centered on the internalization of external e?ects by the means of liability law, i.e. the allocation of a liability burden possibly depending on the behavior of parties involved in an accident. In the by now standard framework, introduced by path-breaking contributions such as Calabresi (1970) and Brown (1973), the outcome with regard to care-taking (and possibly the level of activity) under several liability rules, which are actually observed in practice, is compared to what is socially desirable. The objective of society usually is assumed to be wealth maximization. The set of results which may be called the central theory show that liability rules can indeed induce ?rst-best behavior by parties, as long as several core assumptions hold. After the central theory of the economics of tort law had been settled, contributors to the literature started to test the robustness of the conclusions obtained when these core assumptions are varied. | | 出版日期 | Book 2008 | | 關(guān)鍵詞 | Care incentives; Liability; Risk Aversion; Tort Law; law and economics; transaction cost | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-8349-1292-3 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-8349-8127-1 | | copyright | Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesbaden 2008 |
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