| 書目名稱 | On the Foundations of Credit Rationing | | 編輯 | Helena Maria Krebs | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/702/701166/701166.mp4 | | 圖書封面 |  | | 描述 | Helena Maria Krebs?analyzes equilibrium credit rationing when banks compete for loans and deposits in a double-sided Bertrand game. Borrowers and lenders are allowed to switch market sides. Thus, investors do not only base their decisions on loan rates, but also on opportunity costs in the form of deposit rates. Credit rationing may occur if adverse selection due to borrowers’ informational advantage leads to a lower expected return on loans if the loan rate increases. In that case, banks may have an incentive to offer loan rates below the market-clearing rate. At these rates loan demand exceeds loan supply. The author reveals the important role of bank equity and its distribution: Banks with high equity offer cheap loans and reject superfluous loan applicants, whom banks with low equity then offer expensive loans. Thereby expensive banks realize a higher expected return on loans thancheap banks. Furthermore, this book is the first to formally model the process of acceptance and rejection of loan applicants as a separate stage of the double-sided Bertrand game after banks have decided on their interest rates. It is shown that for fixed chosen interest rates, the deposit and loan vo | | 出版日期 | Book 2024 | | 關(guān)鍵詞 | Banking; Credit rationing; Adverse selection; Double sided Bertrand competition; Market side switching; R | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-44488-4 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-658-44487-7 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-658-44488-4 | | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wies |
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